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Abstract
Borders have become one of the most controversial topics of our times. Identifiable borders, be they 
physical barriers, markings or the physical delimiters of socially constructed entities, are essential 
to how we designate living spaces, land allocations, territorial ownership and jurisdiction and, in a 
more abstract sense, how we analyze and study natural and social realities as such. 
Throughout the war in Syria during the past few years we have seen a mass migration within and 
out of Syria in search of safety. Some of the internally displaced persons (IDP) sought refuge along 
the border with Israel, Syria’s seven-decade-long mortal enemy. This choice might seem odd in light 
of the fact that these refugees show no intention of crossing the border into Israeli controlled areas. 
The article focuses on the “border area” as a space in itself, an unplanned, independent locus 
that because of unanticipated, anomalous circumstances became a haven from danger for Syrian 
refugees. These “internal refugees” effectively exploited the proximity of Israeli military forces to 
shield and protect themselves from their current feared assailants. Syrian IDP flee to areas where 
personal safety and protection were considered inconceivable in the past.
The border areas adapted by Syrian displaced persons to their need for safe refuge are products 
of the interaction between desperate but resourceful people and the reality of displacement, 
insecurity and lack of shelter. The habitable spaces they created derive their distinctive character 
not from recognized theories of planning or regulatory oversight, but from the logic, ingenuity and 
inspiration of the mother of invention: necessity or, in more prosaic terms, from the exigencies of 
“informal planning.” 
DOI: 10.14324/111.444.amps.2018v13i4.001, © 2018, The Authors. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
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Definitions of things, places or ideas circumscribe their subject matter within 
boundaries that indicate what is included and what is excluded from the thing 
itself. Identifiable borders, be they physical barriers, markings or the physical 
delimiters of socially constructed entities, are essential to how we designate 
living spaces, land allocations, territorial ownership and jurisdiction and, in a 
more abstract sense, how we analyze and study nature itself. Apart from the 
latter epistemic use for identification and classification, in the case of socially 
defined entities, such as national territories, borders delineate the scope of the 
entity’s social significance, for example the jurisdictional limits of geo- political 
entities. Setting the borders of a social, political or legal entity has conse-
quences and implications over and above the epistemological dimension. 
Marking territorial borders has existed throughout history1 to delineate land 
ownership and the limits of territorial sovereignty, as well as the territorial 
domains of deities.2 The Bible3 refers to physical border markings and explic-
itly prohibits land theft by surreptitiously moving such markers. In Ancient 
Mesopotamia, Egypt and China territorial markings took different forms as 
stelae and fortifications around kingdoms, public property and national realms.4
In recent years we have witnessed challenges to modern national borders 
both militarily and conceptually. The heated debate in America and Europe 
regarding open versus closed border crossings, the proliferation of fences and 
walls between countries, such as India and Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq, Hungary and Serbia and Greece and Turkey,5 the declaration by ISIS 
in July, 2014 of its intention to eradicate Middle Eastern borders created by 
France and Britain6 – attest to the continued importance of borderline demar-
cations in today’s world. 
Border Areas
National borders do not only consist of de jure borderlines demarcating 
the legal, political or geographical boundaries between adjoining countries 
DOI: 10.14324/111.444.amps.2018v13i4.001
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but also of “border areas” consisting of spaces, sometimes inhabitable, that 
can be identified and characterized as entities in themselves. These areas are 
not uniform or necessarily similar in nature. Some may be threatening and 
inhospitable like their adjoining borders, even potential launching pads for 
aggression, yet others may be regarded as sanctuaries from violence where 
“the other” is acknowledged, tolerated and accepted. 
Unplanned Spaces
One of the primary goals of zoning or designing spaces for habitation is 
to maximize the benefits of accessibility, convenience, safety, etc., for the 
intended residents. While these goals are not always achieved due to poor 
planning or unforeseen eventualities, the need for planning is generally 
regarded as necessary for providing living spaces that best fulfil our needs 
and expectations. What, however, about unplanned spaces or areas initially 
planned or zoned for one purpose but subsequently used differently? Border 
areas often fall into one of these indeterminate categories. The following 
essay will address the topic of unplanned spaces and explain, through the 
living example of a border area, how such spaces can be adapted to meet vital 
human needs during times when planned and designed spaces fail to do so. 
The Unplanned Border Area along the Israeli–Syrian Border
In the following article I shall focus on the “border area” as a space in itself, an 
independent locus, which because of unanticipated, anomalous circumstances 
became a haven from danger for Syrian refugees. Looking across Israel’s 
northern border towards the Syrian side of the Golan, one sees several infor-
mal, makeshift settlements inhabited by displaced persons who purposely 
situated themselves close to the border surprisingly for reasons of safety. As 
we shall explain in detail below, by so doing they effectively exploited the 
proximity of Israeli military forces to shield and protect themselves from their 
current feared assailants. 
This unusual military and political scenario in the Golan Heights reveals 
how spaces adjoining borders can defy and confound our normal concep-
tion of the necessity and indispensability of planning in the creation of 
viable living spaces. As we shall explain, it was the absence of planning that 
made the Syrian encampments in areas bordering Israel into viable living 
spaces. In Darwinian terms, the survival of these refugees is due to their 
ability to adapt to an environment that, contrary to common conceptions, 
provides them with relative safety and protection from the ravages of war. 
In normal times we design and plan cities, neighborhoods and homes in 
order to make them livable and responsive to our needs. In times of radical, 
unanticipated events, such as war and social chaos, however, the uncharted 
potentialities of unplanned spaces may be preferable to the known benefits 
of planned ones. 
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Internally Displaced Person (IDP)
Our historical era is increasingly being marked by population movements. 
These movements or displacements are due to various causes, including both 
“push” and “pull” factors. People are driven from their homes and native 
countries because of race, religion, ethnicity, politics, etc., while others are 
drawn to more comfortable and economically viable places.
The former “pushed” group of displaced persons consists of: a) refugees 
who escape to other countries and b) internally displaced persons (IDPs) who 
leave their homes and seek refuge within their own country.7 According to the 
Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre over six million persons have been 
displaced in Syria, both internally and externally, since the beginning of the 
conflict in 2011. This number constitutes a little less than a third of the entire 
original population of Syria.8 It is safe to say that all these displaced persons 
fled mortal danger. 
This massive displacement is manifest in an exodus of Syrian refugees, pri-
marily to Turkey, Jordan and Europe, but also to areas within Syria consid-
ered to be less threatening. Internally displaced persons differ from refugees in 
two substantive ways. First, they remain within their country of origin where 
they speak the language, know the culture and sometimes are connected to 
extended social networks that they can rely on for shelter and assistance. 
Second, unlike those who emigrate, they live within an ever-present state of 
warfare. While some may be closer than others to actual battle areas, they all 
experience the ongoing deprivations of war and displacement. One should 
bear in mind that these displaced persons are not accidental bystanders 
caught in crossfires but, despite being non-combatants, they themselves are 
targeted. If they inhabit areas controlled by the rebels, they are suspected 
of collaborating or assisting them and, therefore, they are targeted like the 
enemy rebel combatants. 
Many internally displaced persons head towards their country’s borders, 
some in order to cross into a neighboring country while others may decide to 
remain and settle close to the border. In the latter case, there are various sce-
narios: some intend (but are not always able) to cross the border eventually, 
while others remain and set up makeshift homes near the border for as long 
as danger persists. In either case proximity to the border is chosen because it 
is considered to be a place of relative safety and refuge.9 
If it were possible, personal interviews and interactions with the Syrian 
IDP in their border settlements would have enabled my including an account 
of the spatial praxis of these internally displaced people. Unfortunately, due 
to strictly enforced military restrictions and personal safety considerations, 
I was unable to obtain living testimonies save for private conversations 
with “sources” who, in their official capacities as international observers, 
soldiers, aid workers, health providers, etc., shared their experiences and 
observations with me. Conversations with these unofficial sources set the 
seemingly paradoxical ideas of border, safe area, refuge, unplanned spaces 
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and the like in motion in my mind. Although I have full confidence in the 
reliability of their observations, I respect and understand their requests to 
remain anonymous.
My inability to gain access to the IDP in order to present personal first-
hand accounts of their spatial praxis, of the living reality of displaced people 
coping, improvising, and interacting with the unplanned environment of 
these de facto “cities of refuge” prevented me from including a first-person 
counterpart to the theoretical and empirical observations in this essay. In 
a way, this too is indicative of their precarious situation. When conditions 
allow, however, I hope to visit these areas in order to observe and discuss in 
greater detail the spatial praxis of the inhabitants of these areas.
The Space of Borders: A Theoretical Analysis
Borders are demarcation lines between areas and places regarded as separate 
and distinct from one another. The border demarcating a sovereign area 
serves the double purpose of determining inclusion and exclusion. It enables 
those within the enclosed areas to derive meaning and cohesiveness from their 
location with respect to the border.10 “We, who are here, are x; you who are 
there, are y.” This delineation signifies and reinforces the determination of 
political identity through jurisdiction.11 
Figure 1. A general view of a refugee camp on the Syrian side of the Israeli-Syrian 
border, in the Golan Heights near the Syrian village of Aesheh, June 27, 2014. Photo 
by: Ancho Gosh and Gil Eliyahu – JINIPIX.
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The idea of political and national sovereignty is conceptually related to 
the concept “border” because: a) sovereignty expresses a relationship of a 
certain kind, like the terms “father,” “master,” “employee” and, therefore, 
must be qualified with respect to something else such as a polity, a collective, 
a population and, in the case of political sovereignty, a territory; b) territorial 
sovereignty entails the exercise of certain powers within the boundaries of a 
particular territory and hence it entails the ability to differentiate between 
what or who is “in” and what or who is “out”; c) borders demarcate what/
who is “in” and what/who is “out.” The “border” both in theory and in prac-
tice designates the boundaries and limits of sovereignty. 
“Misplaced Concreteness”
The conceptual definition of borders as epistemic delineators of ideas and 
objects is sometimes forgotten by those who identify the notion of borders 
with the policies they are used to implement, especially when these policies 
have a significant impact on people’s lives. The borders of countries whose 
entry and departure policies are considered objectionable and unjustified 
may become the main focus of attention, with their particular policies and, 
by association, the idea of borders as such become the primary objects of 
criticism. By reducing the concept of borders to one or more of its offensive, 
inequitable manifestations, one may turn “the border” or “borders” into an 
opprobrium, a concrete reification of stereotypical instantiations, such as 
massive concrete barriers, soldiers with machine guns, hostile border offi-
cials, etc. 
In her book, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, Wendy Brown claims that 
“walls would seem to express power that is material, visible, centralized, and 
exerted corporeally through overt force and policing.”12 It is undoubtedly 
true that people tend to associate concrete barriers with power and control, 
while many extend this association to the very concept of “border” as if 
borders per se implied discrimination and exclusion for morally indefensible 
reasons. Yet, as discussed previously, the logical processes of demarcation 
and delineation are conceptually independent of the purposes for which they 
may be used (or abused). Like the epistemological activities of identification 
and classification, these processes are vital for defining ideas, objects and 
human constructs as such. 
The most common three-dimensional manifestations of the familiar two-
dimensional border lines on maps are fences and walls. Brown acknowledges 
that walls and fences do not have intrinsic or persistent meaning as borders.13 
Hadrian’s Wall is a charming tourist attraction today but when it was con-
structed it surely was menacing to some and comforting to others. Physical 
barriers such as fences and walls (e.g., the Berlin Wall) that implement 
repressive, totalitarian policies are not themselves the sources of the injustice 
and social hardships they cause. The functional significance of such objects 
does not inhere in the objects themselves but is derived from their social and 
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political contexts and, to some extent, from the individual perspective of the 
observer. 
Fences surrounding a playground, for example, may have been built origi-
nally to prevent children from running into a busy street. Once built, however, 
one may view these fences as structures built to protect and ensure the safety 
of the children or as borders that demarcate the limits of this particular play-
ground. Depending on one’s perspective, a child might regard the barrier as 
a troublesome hindrance to his or her freedom of movement, an adult might 
view it as a means to protect the child from injury, and a municipal official 
might view it as a prudent measure to protect the municipality from legal 
liability were an injury to occur. 
Loose Sovereignty
Apart from the variety of connotations and associations of the idea of 
borders depending on context and individual perspective, the physical struc-
ture, environment and atmosphere of actual borders can vary significantly. 
For example, even though the ambience and conditions at border cross-
ings usually reflect the relations between the bordering sovereign countries, 
these areas may be characterized by an informal atmosphere of “loose sov-
ereignty.” Most border crossings are used by ordinary people rather than 
by official state representatives14 and, consequently, are places of informal 
human interactions rather than of formal political dealings. Totalitarian and 
police states notwithstanding, the informal atmosphere of border crossings, 
their special status with respect to government regulations (e.g., duty-free 
shops), the “interregnum” of being betwixt and between jurisdictions, namely 
the different regulations of the countries – all contribute to creating an ambi-
ence of an interim, autonomous region. 
The border and the individual are, in this way, seen as regulatory sites – borders 
to be policed – and the border-crossers are the only active (and thus the only 
responsible) elements of immigration.15
International airports, for example, serve as national border crossings 
although from the perspective of sovereignty they can be described as areas 
of “loose sovereignty.” Countries may allow duty-free shopping or relinquish 
their legal right to collect VAT from local citizens traveling abroad.16 This 
form of “loose sovereignty” also enables countries to maintain holding cells 
where people may be held without their being considered to have actually 
entered the country. 
International airports usually consist of modern, contemporary structures 
not necessarily located on or near the country’s geographical borders. The fact 
that these national entry and departure areas do not look like the stereotypi-
cal border crossing, reinforces the point that “the border” is ultimately a legal 
jurisdictional concept that may be embodied in a material object or a place. 
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Shifting Borders and Gray Zones in times of Social Change
The functional significance of borders for identifying ideas, objects and social 
entities is best understood in times of social change when the legitimacy 
of certain entities and “individualities” are challenged and possibly being 
replaced by others. Saskia Sassen has noted that today the faces of sovereignty 
and of borders themselves are different from what they once were, and the 
mechanisms of “bordering” have changed radically, although they still exist.17 
Lebbeus Woods describes our situation today as a “boundary condition,” a 
borderline, between “globalization” leading towards the “economic and cul-
tural unification of the planet” and ultimately to “a homogeneous geography 
into which all borders would simply vanish” and the established order where 
“borderlines separated only hostile and contradictory systems.” Due to the 
“inevitable delay” of the endpoint when all national borders vanish and cul-
tural differences disappear, we are currently in a “state of ambivalence … an 
indefinite “between” zone, giving new significance to the idea of “borderline.”’ 
According to Woods we are living in an age where old national and cultural 
borders are gradually dissolving into new “gray zones” where the new and 
old mix, revealing new borders delimiting other “individualities” unlike the 
“social stereotypes … of established cultures”: 
within the borderline are other borderlines … as many of them as there are 
individualities seeking to assert the differences that make them “other” and yet 
impel most of them to negotiate together some form of common ground, that 
which constitutes a community and a culture. The rules of dialogical negotia-
tion within the borderline are necessarily more spontaneous, therefore more 
inventive, than those employing social stereotypes governing the stability- 
seeking centers of established cultures. What is constructed inside the border-
lines is … the tectonic and spatial elements of a new landscape.18 
So, in addition to demarcating sharp “in/out” zones, border areas can obfus-
cate the severity of this binary condition by becoming gray areas of waning 
sovereignty.
Displaced Persons and the Syrian–Israeli Border Areas 
A theoretical analysis of borders may not be of much interest to displaced 
persons in search of refuge but examining their behavior and their reasons for 
selecting certain border areas rather than other areas may reveal crucial – but 
previously unnoticed –characteristics of these border areas. Border-crossing 
planners unfamiliar with historical precedents of the type occurring in Syria 
today may not be aware of the multidimensional nature and potentialities of 
these spaces. 
As mentioned above, the ominous connotation of national borders as rigid 
“you’re in/you’re out” barriers does not apply to all border areas. Border 
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areas best described by notions of “loose sovereignty,” “gray zone” and 
“unplanned area” are places where the legislative and political presence of 
governments is restrained and non-threatening, where areas adjoining the 
actual borders are not “sterile areas” where displaced persons fear to tread. 
In the case of the Syrian settlements under discussion, it is clear that “loose 
sovereignty” was a necessary condition for their being considered as potential 
areas of refuge by displaced Syrians.  
Displaced Syrians who chose to settle within these border areas did so not 
because these areas were designed as safe and comfortable residential spaces 
but, on the contrary, because they were unplanned and had the potential of 
serving their pressing, immediate needs. The refugees’ former habitations in 
planned residential areas could no longer deliver on their implicit promise of 
safe and secure living conditions and, therefore, their inhabitants had to seek 
radical alternatives that could provide them with the protection and safety 
they desperately needed. 
In situations of warfare and political disorder, chaos can be a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, chaos generates real and immediate dangers 
that drive people from their homes, yet, on the other hand, chaos may dis-
close places of relative safety and refuge to escape to. As Lebbeus Woods 
states, “The lack of certain knowledge in a world of unpredictable change 
creates borderlines today that exist as distinct, often extensive spaces in 
vast gray zones of transition. These borderlines no longer separate cer-
tainties, but become spaces where uncertainties meet, interact, fuse or are 
repelled.”19 Like Woods’ gray areas, the border areas chosen by these Syrian 
IDP refugees were not formless and empty but had the potential of taking 
on new forms and contents: “the tectonic and spatial elements of a new 
landscape.”20 
History of the Golan Heights 
The Golan Heights geologically is an elevated plateau created by the tec-
tonic rift that is part of the Syro-African Depression. Archeological finds 
attest to the familiar Levantine tradition of conquest and resettlement in 
this area, which has been continually inhabited for thousands of years.21 The 
empires and populations that lived in and controlled these areas included the 
Amorites, Arameans, Israelites,22 Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, 
Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, and the Seljuks, the Fatimids, the Ottomans, the 
French, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Israel. 
After being engaged with Syria in two wars, Israel today effectively controls 
two-thirds of the Golan Heights, although the legality of its control is not 
recognized by most UN members.23 Without expanding on the legal, military 
and strategic aspects of this controversial situation, suffice it to say that rela-
tive calm has prevailed east of the de facto border, that is, the ceasefire lines, 
during the past several years. Unlike other Israeli borders, very few violent 
clashes have occurred since the last major war between Israel and Syria in 
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October 1973. Even the potential escalation of hostilities during the 1982 
Lebanon War did not materialize but evolved into a quiet balance of power. 
Although the two countries are officially in a state of war, commerce has 
taken place between Israeli and Syrian controlled areas. 24
The borderline that exists today is the result of ceasefire negotiations 
between Israel and Syria and is administered by the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Established in 1974, UNDOF 
patrols the ceasefire lines and acts as a de facto go-between for forces on both 
sides of the border. There are three lines that form a buffer zone between the 
two countries: the border itself, known as the “Purple Line,” which is shad-
owed by the “Alpha” line to the West, which Israeli forces are not permitted 
to cross. A third line, the “Bravo” line, shadows the border to the East, which 
Syrian forces may not cross. 
Figure 2. Map by Maier Yagod based on © OpenStreetMap contributors.
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UN forces do not patrol the Area of Separation (AOS) as regularly as they 
did before March 2013, when 21 Fijian UN personnel were taken captive 
by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade25 linked to Islamic State (ISIS) and later 
released. UNDOF still staffs the unofficial border crossings between Israel 
and Syria, but although established to supervise the ceasefire, UNDOF has 
neither the mandate nor the ability to protect the Syrian civilian population. 
Mainly engaged in observation and reporting, UNDOF forces do not consti-
tute a military factor to be reckoned with in the region. As a result, the safety 
that internally displaced persons sought could not be provided by UNDOF 
but, ironically, could be as I shall explain, by the Israeli army. 
The Golan Heights played a minor role in the Syrian Civil War which 
began as part of what was then referred to as the “Arab Spring.” In the 
course of the war various forces controlled different parts of the Syrian Golan 
Heights, including Bashar Assad’s government army, aided by the Hezbollah 
and Iranian government troops; ISIS forces, their affiliates and offshoots; and 
other Syrian opposition forces as well. The balance of power in these areas is 
not really germane to our topic and, in any event, by the time of publication 
it may change substantially.26 What is relevant, however, is the fact that the 
political and military changes can and do affect the movement of civilians 
seeking refuge from the forces controlling a given area and/or from the forces 
fighting the forces controlling that area. 
This blood-soaked civil war led to massive migrations of Syrians in search 
of safety both within and beyond the borders of their country. Among the 
displaced persons who remained in Syria some resettled close to the border 
with Israel. These areas, which previously had been used mainly as farmland, 
ceased being cultivated due to the ravages of war. The marred and bomb-
cratered landscape reveals the unmistakable signs of war, sadly reminding us 
that though chosen by these displaced persons as “safe areas,” the designation 
“safe” should always be qualified as “relatively safe.” While safer than their 
abandoned homes and towns, these areas are not free of the mortal dangers 
that plague this war-torn region.
An Original Understanding of “Safe Area” 
Our use of the term “safe space” or “safe area” differs completely from the 
accepted usage of the term in architecture and in city and neighborhood 
planning with respect to normally functioning societies. A vast literature 
exists on the subject of crime prevention and the promotion of neighborhood 
safety through environmental design. The term “Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED)” was popularized largely by the criminolo-
gist C. Ray Jeffery27 and the architect Oscar Newman, who coined the term 
“Defensible Spaces.”28 Because personal safety and protection are considered 
basic elements of the genius loci most people want in their dwelling spaces, the 
idea was to plan neighborhoods whose physical design and layout maximized 
surveillance, transparency and safety. 
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Another familiar use by planners of the qualifier “safe” together with 
“space,” “area” or “zone” is the “eyes on the street”29 concept formulated 
by Jane Jacobs in The Rise and Fall of Great American Cities,30 where neigh-
bors are expected to look out for one another and maintain the safety of 
their neighborhoods by their overt presence in the streets. This idea, termed 
“natural surveillance” by Jeffery and others, is of interest for our current 
topic only to highlight the striking contrast between the types of surveil-
lance believed to produce the coveted safety of these two “safe areas.” In the 
case of Syrian IDPs near the Israeli border, surveillance is performed not by 
naturally caring neighbors but by an enemy whose wariness and vigilance 
produces deterrence that, in turn, produces the relative safety of the areas 
wherein the IDP find refuge. The phenomenon of a threat of violence sus-
taining the absence of violence brings to mind the situation of mutual deter-
rence during the cold war period between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.31 
The Border Area: A Safe Space of Refuge
As discussed above, the border as a geopolitical zone often evokes images of 
an intimidating place, a gradient space marked by ominous warning signs, 
like “Border Ahead!” as if proximity to the border was inherently correlated 
with increased danger and risk. For many, it is inconceivable that people 
would actually choose to live in such areas. 
Yet, in certain parts of the world these very spaces are being inhabited as 
places of refuge, ironically because of the perceived consequences of these 
intimidating features, albeit indirectly. The encampments of internally dis-
placed people along the Israel–Syria border in the Golan Heights show that 
this anomalous phenomenon is not unique, capricious or unreasonable.32
Situated as close as possible to the Israeli border on the Syrian side, the 
safety of the IDP encampments is sustained by a seemingly counter-intuitive 
logic: instead of seeking safety in places that are secluded, inaccessible and 
facilitate arms procurement for self-defense, these displaced persons chose 
an area that is public, open, accessible and conspicuously close to an arch-
enemy’s border. Given the realization that the arch-enemy is the enemy of 
their immediate, more threatening enemy and is not bent on exploiting their 
weakness and vulnerability, the IDP’s rationale is quite sound and simple: 
If fired upon by government or opposition forces, and if a rocket, bullet or 
other projectile falls inadvertently on the Israeli side, then the Israeli army 
will retaliate forcefully. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is not negli-
gible. It occurred on a number of occasions,33 and Israel’s consistent military 
responses to what it refers to as “spill over” has had a deterrent effect, which, 
in turn, has resulted in the relative calm and safety of the IDP border area 
settlements. Thus, the zones immediately adjacent to the Israeli border ceased 
being dangerous no-go zones but, instead, became the very opposite: places of 
refuge for displaced Syrians. 
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The political and nuclear strategist Thomas C. Schelling explained the prin-
ciple of deterrence best:
Thus, strategy – in the sense in which I am using it here – is not concerned with 
the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force. It 
is concerned not just with enemies who dislike each other but with partners 
who distrust or disagree with each other. It is concerned not just with the divi-
sion of gains and losses between two claimants but with the possibility that 
particular outcomes are worse (better) for both claimants than certain other 
outcomes.34
By taking refuge in these border areas, these Syrian IDPs turned the Israeli 
army into the unwitting guarantor of their safety. In this case, the enemy of 
my enemy is not my friend but my de facto protector. 
It would be mistaken to liken the safety of these areas to the “calm in the 
eye of the storm” phenomenon. The Golan border IDP settlements actually 
turn on its head the idea that central areas in a conflict, where the command 
headquarters and the main forces are located, are necessarily safer than 
outlying areas less protected and more vulnerable to attack. In the case of 
the Golan, the peripheral areas are less likely to be attacked because of the 
grave risk of opening up additional fronts with neighboring enemy forces. 
Also, the powerful deterrent effect of attacking in these areas is not lost on 
government and opposition forces who exploit these areas to their advan-
tage. Like that of refuge-seeking IDP, their strategy is that attacking enemy 
forces near the Israeli border runs the risk of accidentally provoking severe 
Israeli retaliation. 
We should not be naïve about the intentions and interests of the involved 
parties. Israel does not maintain an army for the benefit of Syrian displaced 
persons, but, rather, in order to prevent infiltration from its northern border. 
Nevertheless, neither the Syrian army nor the opposition rebels have a good 
track record in protecting Syrian lives. Clearly marked white refugee tents 
were less than effective in protecting the refugees in al-Rukban near the 
Jordanian border on January 21, 2017.35 Unlike the deterrence-based safe 
zones adjoining the Israeli border, the location of the al-Rukban refugee 
camp in the demilitarized zone between Jordan and Syria, and the conspicu-
ous markings of IDP habitations provided little, if any, protection for the 
civilian population, as the number of targeted IDP camps shows.36 That being 
said, less than 4,000 refugees37 have chosen the border with Israel as a place 
of refuge, while around 70,000 internally displaced persons reside in Rukban 
alone.
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Figure 3. An Israeli army vehicle patrols the Israeli-Syrian border, near a refugee 
camp on the Syrian side of the border in the Golan Heights near the Syrian village 
of Aesheh, June 27, 2014. Photo by Ancho Gosh and Gil Eliyahu – JINIPIX.
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The Physical Configuration of the Israel–Syria Border
The physical configuration of the border zone in the Golan Heights has 
changed over the past few years. Whereas on the Syrian side, the fortifica-
tions have not been modified significantly, on the Israeli side, there have been 
changes that reflect an anticipated future threat to its border. In the past, 
most of the physical barriers on the Israeli side consisted of groundworks, 
such as anti-tank trenches, easily blockaded roads, mine fields, etc., aimed 
primarily at blocking the advancement of vehicles and tanks. The border 
fence consisted of a non-lethal signaling mechanism that served mainly as an 
electronic sensor against the intrusion of enemy forces. Today the threat is 
viewed in terms of pedestrians approaching en masse, not unlike the incident 
that occurred on May 15, 2011, when Palestinian demonstrators managed to 
cross the border and enter the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.38 
The Israeli forces have no intention of allowing IDP refugees to cross the 
border (other than for medical treatment), nor do the refugees show any incli-
nation to do so. During past years, Israel has constructed a high wired fence 
that: a) can limit the advance of marching pedestrians, and b) enables visual 
surveillance of the Syrian side where large concrete barriers had previously 
limited surveillance. 
The landscape and defensive formations on the Israeli side have simi-
larly undergone changes. While the older mechanisms still exist, they are 
not routinely upgraded.39 Strategic placement of army bases, watchtow-
ers and  electronic surveillance equipment enables the IDF to observe the 
border without frequent regular patrols. The army’s orientation seems more 
towards visual surveillance than physical obstructions. Long-range surveil-
lance systems render the deployment of personnel and physical obstacles less 
critical and minimize the exposure of patrols to cross-border sniper fire. As a 
result the need for a large physical military presence along the border has 
diminished. 
Informal Planning: Pros and Cons
Persons fleeing battle zones in Syria are, in many cases, fleeing the Syrian state 
itself. The structures, frameworks and bureaucracies that were created osten-
sibly for the benefit and welfare of the citizenry have been used on various 
occasions during the past few years to the detriment of the citizenry. 
Formal planning is essential for the orderly management of any state. To 
this end, planned neighborhoods, streets, addressable buildings and homes 
organize the landscape into units that can be identified and accessed by name, 
address, location, etc. Even traditional villages can be subject to infrastruc-
tural regulations and norms. The imposition of such regulatory standards 
enables the state to manage and provide vital services to its citizens. States can 
control and regulate planned living spaces that comprise the physical skeletal 
structure of the state. Mail can be delivered, sewage systems can dispose of 
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noxious waste, garbage can be collected and removed by government sanita-
tion workers, etc. 
Informal planning, on the other hand, occurs primarily when the state 
apparatus does not deliver the quality of life it promises and is mandated 
to provide, or, in extreme situations, when the state turns against its own 
citizens. The concept of informal planning has been extensively explored in 
architectural literature in the 1960s by John F. C. Turner, Rem Koolhaas, 
Alfredo Brillembourg, Hubert Klumpner and others.40 One of the main ideas 
that emerged was that there is value and intellectual capital in the spaces 
created by informal planning. In their article, “The Ideologies of Informality: 
Informal Urbanisation in the Architectural and Planning Discourses,” Jan 
Van Ballegooijen and Roberto Rocco discuss various approaches and atti-
tudes in the architectural critique of informal planning, especially the ten-
dency by some to idealize these forms of urban living spaces.41
Stable governments discourage temporary forms of habitation and other 
by-products of informal planning because they are difficult to manage and 
control. Governments prefer organized, structured living spaces with clear 
reference points and principles of operation that are similar throughout the 
state. That being said, it is often the state itself that is responsible for engaging 
in or allowing informal planning within its field of jurisdiction.42
The makeshift Syrian IDP settlements near the Israeli border do not appear 
to have a regular or planned grid. The houses are covered with white tarp pos-
sibly in order to ensure their visibility and distinctness on the landscape and 
to indicate to the onlooker: “We have no part in the war.” Each settlement 
consists of several scores of houses that noticeably are not temporary dwell-
ings, such as tents or caravans, but small dwellings made of light construction 
material. The dwellings appear to have been built with anticipated lifespans of 
several months and even years. There are satellite dishes on the roofs of some 
of the houses, but, on the whole, the settlements look like the living spaces of 
the Irish Travelers of the British Isles. 
In short, these settlements have the characteristic appearance and struc-
tural composition of informal planning, that is, their singular purpose is to 
provide for the immediate needs of their inhabitants by making use of mate-
rials and resources that are readily available in the proximate environment. 
Their design and construction reflect what Hernando de Soto referred to as 
“Survival Strategy.”43 
Unplanned settlements may succeed, where their planned counterparts fail, 
at answering the immediate ad hoc needs of people living in extraordinary, 
dire circumstances, such as those faced by the internally displaced Syrians. 
Settlements created through informal planning, however, invariably exhibit 
the qualities of temporality and impermanence even if they persist many 
years. 
Despite its situational advantage in unanticipated, extreme circumstances, 
informal planning is far less proficient than its formal counterpart at 
solving infrastructural, climatic and long-term issues of stability and decay, 
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endurance and deterioration, which invariably require professional experi-
ence and expertise based on the extensive knowledge base of standards, 
regulations, bureaucratic management skills and academic and professional 
schooling, research and training. 
The Border Area: Unplanned Spaces in Unplanned Times
Planning of space for habitation is a dynamic, multi-dimensional endeavor. 
Conventional formal approaches to planning and design rely on principles 
and methodologies appropriate for developing “normal” environments and 
spaces, but not for dealing with exceptional conditions like those faced by the 
Syrian IDPs. While this does not negate the invaluable importance of profes-
sional knowledge, experience and familiarity with the history and variety 
of living spaces and cultural preferences, it shows that habitation design is 
ultimately a process, an interactive negotiation between expectations and 
reality, a human project that may not be reduced to dogmatic conceptions 
and standardized practices. 
One does not usually see a natural growth of inhabitants in borders areas, 
especially those that do not facilitate trade and commerce. While this is true 
under normal circumstances when people seek the benefits of planned spaces, 
under exceptional circumstances, when survival is a predominant concern, 
Figure 4. View of a refugee camp on the Syrian side of the Israeli-Syrian 
border, in the Golan Heights near the Syrian village of Briqa, east of Quneitra, 
February 17, 2016. Photo by Ancho Gosh and Gil Eliyahu – JINIPIX.
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unplanned, loosely governed, gray areas can provide the best conditions for 
responding to the unplanned, abnormal conditions of life. This is why the 
border area can become an ideal space in which to live. 
The border area spaces created by Syrian displaced persons are products 
of the interaction between desperate but resourceful people and the reality of 
displacement, insecurity and lack of shelter. The habitable spaces they created 
derive their distinctive character not from recognized theories of planning 
or regulatory oversight, but from the logic, ingenuity and inspiration of the 
mother of invention: necessity or, in more prosaic terms, from the exigencies 
of “informal planning.” 
The displaced persons who found refuge and relative safety in Golan 
Heights border areas are not at the end of their journey because, unfortu-
nately, the people of Syria are likely to undergo further hardships in the 
foreseeable future. But from the current presence of displaced Syrians in these 
border zones and the dialectical nature of the rationale behind their percep-
tion of these areas as potential safe zones we can learn much about unplanned 
spaces and habitation in general. The marking of new boundaries for the 
purpose of transforming a classic, presumably hostile, border area into a hab-
itable refuge zone shows how the gray borderlines of unplanned spaces can 
be reshaped to meet the unanticipated, unplanned needs of displaced persons 
seeking safety and protection. 
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